A prior signalling stage is added to the prisoner's dilemma and the overall population involved is divided into a number of subpopulations. Evolution involves both local and global imitation-so that the process is formally one of "group selection." A subpopulation that is not signalling and defecting against one and all can be invaded by two "secret handshake" mutants. A subpopulation that is composed entirely of the secret handshake strategy can be invaded by a single "sucker punch" mutant. Nevertheless, if there are at least three subpopulations, the population cooperates always, in the limit as the mutation rate tends to zero.
Introduction
In many circumstances, it is compelling that human beings imitate the choices made by others rather than undertake the costly detailed analysis that would permit fully rational choice. Indeed, biologists and anthropologists often consider imitation to be the basis of culture.
1 Within economics, evolutionary games are motivated by the realistic demand that individuals be boundedly rational, in general, and many of the naive adaptive learning rules used can be interpreted as imitation, in particular. 2 Key results of this literature are that 1 Bonner (1980) discusses animal culture in this light. Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985) consider human societies in which both such cultural evolution and biological evolution occur. Rogers (1988) presents an example where imitation is not socially advantageous.
2 Kandori (1997) and Mailath (1998) provide surveys of this literature. Schlag (1999) discusses theoretical rationales for imitative dynamics.
strategies with the highest payoff in each subpopulation is imitated by all of its members.
The second round serves just to exhibit the payoff obtained by each subpopulation's strategy against itself. After this second round, one of the strategies with the highest payoff present
anywhere is imitated by all players in every subpopulation.
The key result here is as follows. Suppose that all mutation rates are of comparable orders of magnitude and all of these converge to zero. If there are at least three subpopulations, the entire population then cooperates in the prisoner's dilemma. The secret handshake is, in general, needed for this result-nevertheless the secret handshake itself may vanish in this same limit.
In the next section, the key result is derived under some simplifying assumptions. Sections 3 and 4 present a formal treatment of the general model. Section 5 discusses other related papers and Section 6 concludes. The prisoner's dilemma is depicted in Figure 1 , where t > r > p > s (lower-left-corner payoffs are Player 1's). To obtain the intuition for the emergence of cooperation at the expense of defection, consider the following simplified model. Most importantly, the set of strategies is abbreviated, but mutations also arrive in a convenient order.
Defect vs Secret Handshake and Sucker Punch
Take first a single population of N individuals. In each period, there is a round robin tournament, so each player plays every other player once and obtains the resulting average payoff. All players then imitate the existing strategy having the highest payoff.
Suppose the population is initially composed just of cooperators, using C, and defectors, using D. If z D is the number of defectors and π i (z D ) is the average payoff of strategy
Hence the population evolves to all defect if there is at least one defector to start with. Suppose a signal is available, with a small cost δ > 0. Given an initial population of D, consider the introduction of mutants who play the secret handshake, SH: They send the 6 Strategy C is dropped for the rest of this section. Although this may seem innocuous, C is always stochastically stable in the general model when the whole population is divided into two or more subpopulations.
signal before playing; if an opponent signals also, they cooperate; if an opponent does not signal, they defect. 7 The payoffs from a single encounter are as in Figure 2 . If there are z SH secret handshake mutants, their average payoff is π SH (z SH ) =
as is assumed throughout. A cooperative outcome is therefore achieved, with at least two secret handshake mutants. Suppose now a "sucker punch" mutant, SP , that sends the signal but defects against all opponents, is introduced into a population of secret handshakers. The single-encounter 7 The signal is "secret" only in the sense that a population of D-strategists do not condition on it.
8 For such imitation to take place, individuals apparently need to know the complete specification of the most successful strategy. For simplicity, suppose this information is obtained by interrogating those playing this strategy. More generally, if both signallers and non-signallers are present, this information could be obtained by observing those who are most successful. Even if there are only signallers, for example, strategies that differ only in their treatment of non-signallers must have tied payoffs. It is not crucial then which of the two possible best strategies is adopted, although allowing for arbitrary choice would complicate the analysis.
payoffs are as in Figure 3 . If z SP is the number of SP mutants, then, essentially as in the
The SP strategy pays a cost of δ, in contrast to D. Clearly, one D can then invade a population of SP. The signal can now be reused to restart the cycle. Suppose there is a small rate of mutation. At least two mutations are required to leave D for SH, but only one to leave SH for SP or to leave SP for D. The "resistance" from D to SH is then 2, as opposed to 1 from SH to SP and from SP to D, as in Figure 4 . It follows that the prevailing state in the limit when mutation rates tend to zero is defect, D.
Suppose now that the population is divided in M ≥ 3 subpopulations. Mutations occur at the beginning of each period, followed by two round robin tournaments among members of the same subpopulation. After the first tournament, all members of each subpopulation imitate the best "local" strategy. After the second, the best "global" strategy is imitated by all individuals. Thus the most successful subpopulation takes over, as in group selection. In this example, a positive signal cost is needed in order to leave the SP state. However, it will be shown that SP is always vulnerable to a "mirror-image" secret handshake that does not signal, that cooperates against non-signallers but defects against signallers. Two such mutants can invade a population of SP. Hence it is possible to leave SP, even when δ = 0. More discussion of this is in the Appendix. 10 The present process of group selection involves only indirect interaction via imitation. Such imitation
Consider a population where all the subpopulations are playing D. If two SH mutations occur in any one subpopulation, so this switches to SH after the first round, then every subpopulation will imitate it after the second round, since SH has a higher payoff against itself than does D. To leave SH, however, all subpopulations must switch to SP after the first round, since SH has a higher payoff against itself than does SP . The resistance from SH to SP is then M > 2. Finally, to leave SP for D still requires only one mutation in any subpopulation. The situation is then as in Figure 5 . It follows that SH prevails when the rate of mutation is small. The following section shows that the basic conclusion here is robust to allowing all possible pure strategies and all possible mutations. 12 That is: Suppose the mutation rate tends to zero. In this limit, the population defects, when it is not divided in subpopulations; spends requires a flow of information on payoffs and strategies between the subpopulations, as might be provided by word-of-mouth, for example. This contrasts with Hausken (2000) , for example, who considers more direct competition, involving the division of aggregate production between subgroups.
11 If the matching here were a one-shot random pairing of all players, the group selection mechanism would produce C in the limit as the rate of mutation tends to zero, even when C and D are the only strategies. This is because two C mutants have a positive probability of meeting in a subpopulation of D's. However, although this probability is independent of the mutation rate, it is small if N is large, so that considering the limit as mutation rates tend to zero may not be appropriate. (A random matching mechanism was studied by Robson and Vega-Redondo, 1996.) 12 The possibility of multiple best strategies must also be treated.
some time cooperating and some time defecting, when there are two subpopulations; and cooperates, when divided in three or more subpopulations. However, the generalization in the next section is not completely straightforward. For example, the strategy that does not signal and cooperates against all opponents is always stochastically stable when there are two or more subpopulations, as is the strategy that does not signal, cooperates against non-signallers and defects against signallers. The secret handshake itself may or may not be stochastically stable, even with three or more subpopulations.
The General Model
Consider first a description of the prisoner's dilemma, when this is augmented by an earlier stage at which a costly signal can either be sent or not. The overall strategy set is S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s 8 }, as defined in Table 1 , and the game is then as in Figure 6 , where lower-leftcorner payoffs are Player 1's.
The population is composed of M ≥ 1 subpopulations, each with N ≥ 3 members.
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Mutation occurs at the start of each period, followed by two round-robin tournaments within each subpopulation. After the first, individuals imitate one of the strategies in their own subpopulation with the highest payoff. After the second, one of the strategies anywhere that has the highest payoff against itself is imitated by all players. The timing of events is as in Figure 7 . At the beginning of a period, all subpopulations are in the same state s, say. After the first tournament, subpopulation i is homogeneous and in state s (i) , i = 1, ..., M, say.
13 The case N = 2 requires special treatment, but cooperation when M ≥ 3 still arises.
Strategies
Signal? Against no Against yes After the second tournament, imitation of the most successful subpopulation, subpopulation 1, say, brings the entire population to the same state, s (1) .
In detail: At the beginning of a period, all players use the same strategy. Each player then deviates from that strategy with a small probability ε. Given that a player deviates, she chooses strategy i with probability λ i > 0, i = 1, ..., 8, with
The overall probability of deviating to s i from any other strategy is then λ i ε, i = 1, ..., 8 (A player may experiment but then revert to her original strategy).
Let z = (z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z 8 ) describe the number of players using each strategy, immediately after mutation. Suppose the payoff to a s i -strategist against a s j strategist in the first tournament is a ij , so the average payoff of an s i -strategist is then
Set π i (z) = −∞ when z i = 0, so that no absent strategy is imitated.
Imitation is now according to a version of the best reply dynamic from Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), as follows. Let Π(z) = {k : π k (z) = max j π j (z) } and let Ψ(z) = {k ∈ Π(z) :
as the distribution of strategies after the first tournament, given the distribution z before. The first-round best-reply dynamics are then:
where e i is the ith unit vector and #(Ψ(z)) is the size of Ψ(z).
That is: If there is a unique best strategy, all individuals immediately choose it. If there are several best strategies, but one of these has more adherents than any other of these, all individuals choose this one. If there are several best strategies that have the most adherents in this sense, one of these strategies is chosen at random by all individuals. This ensures each subpopulation remains monomorphic after the first tournament.
14 Table 2 presents the minimal number of mutations for a subpopulation initially in any state to switch to any other state after the first tournament. These minimal mutation numbers are resistances, as in Young (1998) . Only some of these resistances are needed 14 These tie-breaking assumptions rule out stable mixtures of strategies with equal payoffs, such as those of s 1 and s 2 . These rules serve to reduce the number of absorbing states, but do not seem to affect whether cooperation or defection would be observed in the end.
exactly; for the rest, lower bounds are sufficient. The resistance from s 7 to s 2 , that is defined to be A, helps determine whether the secret handshake is likely in the long-run. The
Appendix shows that A ∈ {2, ..., N }, that A → ∞ as N → ∞ and presents notes on the other entries. 15 If M = 1, Table 2 The overall resistances between states for the entire population are as in Table 3 . Again, only some of the exact resistances are needed, and lower bounds suffice for the remainder.
Notes on these entries are given in the Appendix. is the probability of a transition from s ∈ S to s ∈ S. Table 3 implies that, if ε is sufficiently 16 The present model involves instantaneous adjustment dynamics after each tournament. However, placing any positive upper bound on the number of imitating subpopulations in the second round would not affect the overall conclusions here. This is for the same reason that the results Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) obtained with the "best reply dynamic" carry over to a more general case. Further, the results here also hold under the more general dynamics sketched as follows. Instead of all individuals, or all subpopulations, imitating with probability one, suppose the number of individuals, or subpopulations, that imitate is randomly drawn after each tournament. In the second phase, suppose further that imitation by an entire subpopulation is of a strategy with the highest payoff within a subpopulation with the highest average payoff over all subpopulations. Assume that s + t < 2r and that ties are dealt with in an analogous fashion to before. Suppose the probability that all individuals (or all subpopulations) imitate is strictly positive. The only stationary states of the unperturbed process remain the eight pure strategy states and, furthermore, the present resistances remain valid. 17 All but one of the resistances needed for the analysis involve the presence of only two strategies. Thus replacing the rule "imitate the best strategy" by "imitate any better strategy" would only matter for the transition from s 7 to s 2 , where s 5 is needed. Altogether, then, Table 2 and Table 3 
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Suppose that µ ε : S → [0, 1] is the unique stationary distribution of P ε , so that µ ε P ε = µ ε .
18 Strategy s 4 requires two mutations to be transformed to s 7 -this is the secret handshake. Other defecting states are even more vulnerable to cooperating mutants. For example, s 8 can be invaded by a single s 2 mutant. Although s 2 simply defects against s 8 , it avoids the cost of the signal, δ > 0. Even if δ = 0, s 2 would function as a secret handshake against s 8 and so only two s 2 mutants could invade an s 8 population. Indeed a transition from defection to cooperation never requires more than two mutants, even if δ = 0. Thus cooperation will still be favored over defection when δ = 0, as long as M ≥ 3.
Since M ≥ 3, it follows that C will be observed with high probability in the long-run, if ε is small. Furthermore, since the probability of transition from D to C is no smaller than a term of order ε 2 , the expected time for the first transition from D to C is no larger than a term of order ε −2 , regardless of M ≥ 3 and N ≥ 3. In this sense, convergence to cooperation is rapid.
This approach lumps cooperating and defecting states together. A more detailed analysis is needed to determine which particular cooperating states are stochastically stable, even if
The next section provides this, also considering the cases M = 1 and M = 2.
Stochastically Stable Distributions
Consider the Markov process P ε with transition resistances as in Table 3 . For every state s ∈ S, a directed graph with a unique path from any state s = s to s defines an s-tree, T s , say. The resistance of this tree, R(T s ), say, is the sum of the resistances of its links. In this model, the recurrent classes of the unperturbed Markov process P 0 are all the singleton states. The "stochastic potential" of each such state s is then the minimum resistance of all the s-trees. A state s is "stochastically stable" iff lim ε→0 µ ε (s) > 0, where µ ε (·) is the 19 Since µ ε is stationary, c,c ∈C µ
The equality then
unique stationary distribution of P ε . Stochastically stable states are then accurate long run predictions, when mutation rates are small. Young (1998, for example) shows that the stochastically stable states are precisely those with minimum stochastic potential.
One Subpopulation
Consider the graph in Figure 8 , where each link drawn attains the minimum resistance over all links originating at the same state, from Table 2 . In general, an s-tree built only from such links must be a minimal s-tree. In the present case, such a minimal s-tree can be built from the graph, for each s, by removing the link originating at s.
Thus the stochastic potential of s i , i = 4, is 8 and the stochastic potential of s 4 is 7, so that:
Theorem 5.1 Consider the system described by the Markov process P ε , where M = 1. The only stochastically stable state is then s 4 .
Defection is the predicted long run outcome when the mutation rate is small. Group selection is needed here to obtain cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma.
Two Subpopulations.
The graph in Figure 9 is again composed of links that have minimal resistance over all links with the same initial state, now from Table 3 . Again, a minimal resistance s-tree can be built from this graph for each s by removing the link from s. The stochastic potential of s 1 , s 2 , s 4 or s 7 is then 10, but the stochastic potential of every other state is 11. Thus: Although s 1 , s 2 , or s 7 involve cooperating, s 4 involves defecting, so two subpopulations is still not enough to eliminate non-cooperative states. (i) Consider first A < M and Figure 10 that then depicts a graph built from minimal resistance links. A minimal resistance s 1 -or s 2 -tree can be obtained from this graph by removing the link originating at s 1 or s 2 , respectively. Although removing the link originating from other s i 's need not produce an s i -tree in this graph, any s i -tree must have at least the resistance obtained by summing the minimal resistances out of all states other than s i . Hence,
Three or More Subpopulations.
(ii) Consider now the case A ≥ M and Figure 11 that depicts a graph also using minimal resistance links from Table 4 .
A minimal resistance s-tree can now be obtained by removing the link from each s, for
Altogether, then:
Theorem 5.3 Consider the system described by the Markov process P ε , for M ≥ 3.
(i) If A < M , there are precisely two stochastically stable states-s 1 and s 2 .
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(ii) If A ≥ M , there are precisely three stochastically stable states-s 1 , s 2 , and s 7 .
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That is, regardless of the value of A, three or more subpopulations ensure that the only stochastically stable states involve cooperation. It is then cooperation rather defection that is likely in the long run when the mutation rate is small. 20 Since A ≤ N, N < M ensures A < M. 21 Choosing N large enough ensures A ≥ M.
To evaluate these results, it is useful to first ask: What would group selection achieve in the unmodified prisoner's dilemma? It can be shown that the answer depends on the relationship between the size of each subpopulation and the number of subpopulations. That is, cooperation obtains when M > N, whereas defection prevails when N > M. The modifications of the game, the secret handshake, in particular, are then necessary for cooperation when N > M ≥ 3. Further, this case where the number in each subpopulation is larger than the number of subpopulations is at least as plausible as the alternative.
The result for N > M ≥ 3 and M > A is especially interesting in that the secret handshake, although it is necessary to obtain cooperation, is not stochastically stable itself.
With a small mutation rate, the secret handshake would then be rare in the long run; as indeed would any occurrence of the signal.
Other Related Work
The imitation of a best strategy in the second round here is analogous to group selection.
Group selection is often dismissed by biologists. 22 The argument is not that a model of group selection is logically impossible but that it requires implausible values of the parameters.
Note that this criticism of group selection lacks much force here since the evolution involved is only metaphorical-selection involves imitation rather than differential reproductive success.
The mechanism here of imitation across subpopulations represents cultural competition, the 22 For example, Williams (1966) describes it as an "unnecessary distraction." Dawkins (1982) argues that the only replicator is the gene. A recent exception is Sober and Wilson (1998) , who argue that biological group selection lies behind altruism.
existence of which is plausible for human beings.
Other work in economics that applies a formal process of group selection is due to VegaRedondo (1993) and Canals and Vega-Redondo (1998). These papers show that a Paretoefficient equilibrium can be selected, in a coordination game, when learning occurs at two levels, within groups and across groups. The present result is stronger in that a Paretoefficient outcome is selected, even when this is not an equilibrium.
In this paper, we considered a modified prisoner's dilemma, with signalling and imitation based on the Kandori, Mailath and Rob best reply dynamic. Although a secret handshake strategy exists, the only stochastically stable state remains defect when the population is not divided into subpopulations. Suppose, however, the population is divided into subpopulations and imitation across subpopulations of the best strategy also occurs. If there at least three subpopulations, the stochastically stable states now all involve cooperation. Table 2 Recall that assumption (A) holds here. It is then straightforward to verify that a single mutant of the final type obtains a higher payoff than the residual population of the initial type, for all the entries in Table 2 Table 3 Given the transitions within each subpopulation have resistances as in Table 2 , the remaining issue is: How many subpopulations must switch for the whole population to make the transition? The payoffs that each strategy obtains against itself, or "own-payoffs," are relevant here. All "≥ 1" entries in Table 3 are again trivial. Also obvious is that no entry in Table ( i) Initial state s 1 . One way to switch to s 2 is for all M subpopulations to mutate, involving at least M mutations. All the other possibilities involve α > 0 subpopulations switching to s 2 , β ≥ 0 switching to some mixture of other states, and M − α − β > 0 remaining s 1 . For s 2 to invade with the same own-payoff, it is necessary that α ≥ M − α − β. The number of mutations needed is then at least 2α + β ≥ M.
Appendix

Notes on
(ii) Initial state s 2 . A similar argument to (i) applies for the transition to s 1 .
(iii) Initial state s 7 . A similar argument also applies for the transition to s 5 .
Costless Signalling
When δ = 0, resistances from non-signalling states to signalling ones may be smaller than those in Tables 2 and 3 , and resistances from signalling states to non-signalling ones may be larger.
In Table 2 , the relevant minimal resistances that depend on δ are as follows.
(i) Initial state s 5 : More than one s 1 mutant and more than one s 3 mutant is now needed to invade.
(ii) Initial state s 8 : Exactly two s 2 mutants are now needed to invade. One mutant alone cannot invade s 8 , so the resistance to any state other than s 2 is ≥ 2.
For a single subpopulation, the links in Figure 8 are still the least resistant when δ = 0, but the link (s 8 , s 2 ) now has resistance 2. That is, with one subpopulation, the stochastic potential of s 4 and s 8 is 8, as opposed to 9 for all s i , i = 4, 8. Therefore, when signalling is costless, and there is one subpopulation, the stochastically stable states are s 4 and s 8 .
In Table 3 , the relevant new minimal resistances are as follows, where x is the smallest integer greater than or equal to x. Least resistant links are now as in Table 5 . Further, it is possible to build an s 2 -tree, an s 7 -tree, an s 4 -tree, and an s 8 -tree using only these minimal resistance links. Indeed, Figure 12 shows these trees for s 2 (left-hand side) and s 7 (right-hand side 
